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EVIDENCE ON FIRE* 
VALENA E. BEETY & JENNIFER D. OLIVA** 
Fire science, a field largely developed by lay “arson 
investigators,” police officers, or similar first responders 
untrained in chemistry and physics, has been historically 
dominated by unreliable methodology, demonstrably false 
conclusions, and concomitant miscarriages of justice. Fire 
investigators are neither subject to proficiency testing nor 
required to obtain more than a high school education. Perhaps 
surprisingly, courts have largely spared many of the now-
debunked tenets of fire investigation any serious scientific 
scrutiny in criminal arson cases. This Article contrasts the courts’ 
ongoing lax admissibility of unreliable fire-science evidence in 
criminal cases with their strict exclusion of the same flimsy 
evidence in civil cases, notwithstanding that both criminal and 
civil courts are required to operate under the same exclusionary 
rules for expert evidence. 
Judges are capable of ensuring that the forensic science evidence 
they admit at trial is reliable in both criminal and civil 
proceedings. In addition, the law mandates that they do so. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. demand the application of the same 
standards to vet the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal 
and civil cases. Moreover, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael expands 
that mandate to exclude capricious forensic evidence regardless 
of whether it is characterized as scientific or technical. 
Unfortunately, thirty-one states have failed to embraced the 
holding of Kumho Tire. As a result, litigants are not entitled to 
raise Daubert challenges to fire evidence that courts deem 
technical, rather than scientific, knowledge in the overwhelming 
majority of American jurisdictions. 
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The ongoing admission of flawed fire science in criminal 
litigation brings us back to the problem Daubert sought to 
address: the courts’ failure to exclude junk science in American 
trials. Criminal courts must follow their civil counterparts and 
rigorously enforce gatekeeping procedures when prosecutors 
proffer questionable forensic “science” evidence in order to 
secure a conviction. Moreover, criminal defense attorneys must 
invoke Daubert and challenge unreliable forensic science during 
the trial proceedings. As several courts have held, the failure to 
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Slow and painful has been man’s progress from magic to law. 
—Ancient Chinese Proverb1 
To achieve justice, the law must serve as the vehicle through 
which imperfect institutions strive for greater justice through a 
more perfect understanding of the truth. Therefore, as our 
understanding of scientific truth grows and changes, the law must 
follow the truth in order to secure justice.2 
Human beings have long been fascinated by the awesome and 
unforgiveable power of fire.3 From old southern stories about barn 
burners4 to The Confession Tapes’ chronicles of false confessions to 
murder by arson,5 fire investigations evoke the worst of human 
imagination. Playing off the evocative and destructive power of fire, 
fire experts historically conjured up pseudomagical powers in the 
courtroom, regaling jurors with investigatory findings that were 
“more art than science” and with stories about accelerant-detection 
dogs’ supercanine olfactory abilities, which enabled them to pinpoint 
a fire’s origin.6 The fire “expert,” imbued with gravitas due to his 
 
 1. Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
June 13, 2014) (“This proverb, inscribed at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on 
the statue of Hseih–Chai, a mythological Chinese beast who was endowed with the faculty 
of discerning the guilty, is a fitting metaphor for both the progress of the law and the 
history of this case.”), adopting report and recommendation sub nom. Lee v. Tennis, No. 
4:CV–08–1972, 2014 WL 3900230 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Han Tak Lee v. 
Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 2. Id. at *19. 
 3. Natalie Wolchover, Why We Are Drawn to Fire, LIVE SCIENCE (Apr. 23, 2012, 
5:27 PM), https://www.livescience.com/19853-fire-fascination.html [https://perma.cc/KKV4-
9SJ4]. 
 4. WILLIAM FAULKNER, Barn Burning, in COLLECTED STORIES OF WILLIAM 
FAULKNER 3, 20–21 (1st Vintage Int’l ed. 1995) (1950). 
 5. See generally The Confession Tapes: Trial by Fire (Netflix 2017). 
 6. John J. Lentini, Evidence Collection at Fire Scenes, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCES 387, 388 (Jay A. Siegel & Pekka J. Saukko eds., 2d ed. 2013), 
http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/NewOrder/2013%20EFS%20Evidence%20Collection
%20from%20Fire%20Scenes-John%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL7G-RFRH] (“As with any 
tool, canines are subject to limitations. The canine responds to scents that it has previously 
been rewarded for alerting to. If, on a particular scene, a canine responds to pyrolysis 
products, rather than foreign ignitable liquids, it is likely to respond inappropriately for 
the rest of the day because it has been rewarded for doing so. Canines are incapable of 
identifying different [ignitable liquid residues].”). 
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uncanny ability to understand the mysteries of the element, easily 
awes and persuades a Western jury, which, as studies have noted, is 
largely composed of individuals unfamiliar with how to start, 
maintain, or use fire.7 As Professor Paul Giannelli has explained, 
For decades arson investigators came from the “old school” of 
investigators—those who used intuition and a number of rules 
of thumb to determine whether a fire was incendiary. Critics 
complained that instead of being rooted in science, the 
approach was based on folklore that had been passed down 
from generation to generation—without any empirical testing. 
A government report noted, as early as 1977, that common 
arson indicators had “received little or no scientific testing” and 
that “[t]here appears to be no published material in the 
scientific literature to substantiate their validity.”8 
Such rules of thumb include numerous scientifically debunked 
myths, such as accelerant-provoked fires burn hotter and faster than 
incendiary fires and crazed glass indicates arson. Unfortunately, these 
and numerous other arson-indicator-related myths were published 
and preserved in two widely referenced fire-science resources: Arson 
and Arson Investigation Survey and Assessment and Fire Investigation 
Handbook.9 Continued reliance on these unreliable resources 
provoked the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(“AAAS”) to characterize fire investigation as a field inundated with 
a “widespread, persistent, and problematic literature affecting the 
beliefs and the behavior of practitioners.”10 
Fire science, as it became known along its “progression from 
magic to science,” is one of several forensic disciplines that has 
 
 7. Wolchover, supra note 3 (explaining that “fire retains greater allure or fascination 
than would normally be the case” for Western peoples as a result of our lack of 
understanding and mastery of the element). 
 8. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
869, 889 (2018) (footnotes omitted) (quoting JOHN F. BOUDREAU ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF 
LAW ENF’T & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION: SURVEY AND 
ASSESSMENT 88 (1977)). 
 9. John J. Lentini, The Mythology of Arson Investigation 1 (unpublished manuscript) 
[hereinafter Lentini, Mythology of Arson Investigation], http://www.firescientist.com/
Documents/THE%20MYTHOLOGY%20OF%20ARSON%20INVESTIGATION,%20isfi%
20manuscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP95-3226]. 
 10. CHARLIE HANGER, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FORENSIC 
SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY AND GAP ANALYSIS—FIRE INVESTIGATION, A 
PLAIN LANGUAGE SUMMARY 6 (2017). 
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historically generated inaccurate expert evidence.11 Our research 
indicates, however, that while civil courts closely scrutinize and often 
exclude unreliable fire-science evidence, criminal courts routinely 
allow it to go to the jury. In criminal arson cases, prosecutors 
frequently proffer—and courts often admit—testimony from “fire 
experts,” that is, scientifically untrained police officers and first 
responders who have completed a multiweek fire investigation 
training usually taught by similarly scientifically untrained police 
officers and first responders.12 In a fire-science-involved civil products 
liability or wrongful death case, on the other hand, litigants 
consistently challenge the admissibility of the opposing party’s fire 
experts, who are usually specialized scientists and chemists, under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 70213 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.14 Civil plaintiffs, often corporations, also tend to 
be willing to finance quality experts, particularly when a court 
decision can impact multiple future cases about a single product. 
Needless to say, civil courts generally exclude proffered expert fire-
science testimony that fails to satisfy Rule 702, commonly referred to 
as the Daubert standard.15 
As a general rule, the “forensic sciences” emerged from law 
enforcement gumshoe-crime-investigation tactics, which relied 
heavily on forensic fields that had never been subjected to scientific 
studies to verify their reliability or validity.16 These fields include, 
among other things, bite mark matching, fingerprint evidence, 
 
 11. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Badly Burned: Long-Held Beliefs About Arson Science 
Have Been Debunked After Decades of Misuse and Scores of Wrongful Convictions, 
A.B.A. J., Dec. 2015, at 37, 37–39. 
 12. JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION, at xv 
(Keith Inman & Norah Rudin eds., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC 
PROTOCOLS] (“The fire investigator .	.	. may have no education beyond high school. His 
training typically consists of a 40-hour ‘basic arson’ school, followed by an 80-hour 
‘advanced arson’ school, and perhaps some continuing education taught by people with 
the same training and more experience.”). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 14. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 15. See Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. Am. Household, Inc., 429 F.3d 469, 477–80 (4th Cir. 
2005); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 
2005); Werth v. Hill-Rom, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1062–63 (D. Minn. 2012); Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Indus. Paper & Packaging Corp., No. 3:02–CV–491, 2006 WL 1788967, at 
*4–5 (E.D. Tenn. June 27, 2006); Ind. Ins. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847–53 
(N.D. Ohio 2004); Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 707, 727–31 (W.D. Va. 
2004); Snodgrass v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-1814(JBS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13421, at 
*45–46 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2002); Chester Valley Coach Works v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 99 
CV 4197, 2001 WL 1160012, at *8–10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2001). 
 16. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 8, at 870. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
488 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
comparative bullet lead analysis, and hair analysis.17 Enter fire 
science, a field developed by arson investigators—that is, police 
officers or similar first responders untrained in chemistry and 
physics—which has been historically dominated by the application of 
unreliable methods and, therefore, faulty conclusions.18 As fire expert 
and methodological critic John Lentini explains, “The introduction 
and persistence of mythology in arson investigation is an unfortunate 
part of the history of the discipline, and is a subject that many fire 
investigators do not like to think about.”19 The limits of fire 
investigation are apparent to scientists: oftentimes, postfire evidence 
is either so severely degraded or nonexistent that it is impossible to 
adequately analyze. Accordingly, typical standards that have been 
heralded as increasing the reliability of comparison and matching 
forensic science fields are often inapplicable to fire science. 
In a recent opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times, famed legal 
novelist John Grisham framed the current state of affairs as follows: 
Over the last five decades, our courtrooms have been flooded 
with an avalanche of unreliable, even atrocious “science.” 
Experts with qualifications that were dubious at best and 
fraudulent at worst have peddled—for a fee, of course—all 
manner of damning theories based on their allegedly scientific 
analysis of hair, fibers, bite marks, arson, boot prints, blood 
spatters and ballistics. Of the 330 people exonerated by DNA 
tests between 1989 and 2015, 71% were convicted based on 
forensic testimony, much of which was flawed, unreliable, 
exaggerated or sometimes outright fabricated.20 
Unfortunately, faulty fire science has been responsible for 
several high-profile wrongful convictions. Unless and until the courts 
close their doors to subjective, inaccurate, and unreliable fire origin 
and causation conclusions, “horror stories about wrongful 
prosecutions and convictions will undermine the public’s confidence 
in the ability of the justice system to respond appropriately to fire 
losses.”21 
We begin this Article by examining the development of fire 
science, its long-standing mythologies, and national challenges to the 
 
 17. See id. at 875. 
 18. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 12, at xv. 
 19. Lentini, Mythology of Arson Investigation, supra note 9, at 2. 
 20. John Grisham, Why the Innocent End Up in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2018, at 
A21. 
 21. John J. Lentini, The Evolution of Fire Investigation and Its Impact on Arson Cases, 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 12, 62. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
2019] EVIDENCE ON FIRE 489 
field’s methodologies and practices. Part II of this Article discusses 
the evolution of fire science from a field dominated by unreliable, 
experiential intuition to one that has codified methodological best 
practices guidelines. The fire investigation community has proven 
resistant to these evidence-based standards. We then compare the 
treatment of faulty fire science in civil courts, which generally exclude 
such evidence, with that of criminal courts, which often admit the 
same. As emphasized in our first piece in this trilogy of essays and 
articles on forensic evidence, Discovering Forensic Fraud, judges are 
capable of ensuring that forensic science evidence produced at trial is 
reliable.22 In fact, the charge for reform that has revolutionized the 
reliability of modern-day fire science was instigated by corporate 
defendants subjected to civil liability in insurance coverage and 
products liability actions. These civil litigants have raised formidable 
Daubert challenges to exclude so-called fire-science “experts” from 
trial and, ultimately, created a body of case law demanding greater 
reliability and substantive scientific findings from fire investigators. 
Part III of this Article explains that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and Daubert demand the application of the same standards 
to vet the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal and civil cases. 
Nonetheless, and similar to other questionable forensic-expert 
evidence proffered by prosecutors, unreliable and unsubstantiated 
arson-expert testimony continues to be routinely admitted in criminal 
cases and has led to high-profile wrongful convictions. This part goes 
on to discuss a trifecta of issues that infect fire-science investigations 
in arson cases: negative corpus theory, the risk of compounding 
errors, and common cognitive biases heuristics. 
Part IV of this Article acknowledges that forensic-science-
induced wrongful convictions are not solely attributable to criminal 
courts and explains that criminal defense counsel who fail to raise 
trial-level Daubert challenges frequently fall below the constitutional 
standard for effective advocacy. This part also explains that defense 
counsel is precluded from raising trial-level Daubert challenges in 
jurisdictions that classify fire science as technical, rather than 
scientific, evidence and have failed to adopt Kumho Tire. 
The final part of this Article proposes solutions. Science is 
catching up with fire investigation, and we urge criminal courts to 
follow their sister civil courts and catch up too. We also contend that, 
while criminal fire-investigation units should adopt the National Fire 
 
 22. Jennifer D. Oliva & Valena E. Beety, Discovering Forensic Fraud, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 121, 134 (2017). 
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Protection Association guidelines, courts are still required to grapple 
with the guidelines’ reliability flaws when conducting a Daubert 
assessment. We conclude our Article by advocating for the adoption 
of error rates, Linear Sequential Unmasking, and a standardized tool 
to evaluate the quality of the evidence at issue in fire investigation in 
order to mitigate the pernicious role of cognitive biases in forensic 
science investigations. We also propose that courts demand that fire-
science investigation be sequestered from criminal investigations and 
appoint their own experts in arson cases where the state relies 
exclusively on law enforcement testimony. 
I.  NATIONAL CHALLENGES TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 
In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) published a 
report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (the “NAS Report”), which challenged and criticized myriad 
forensic science disciplines, including fire science.23 The NAS Report, 
which was the product of three years of research and study, opens by 
opining that “[i]t is clear that change and advancements, both 
systemic and scientific, are needed in a number of forensic science 
disciplines—to ensure the reliability of the disciplines, establish 
enforceable standards, and promote best practices and their 
consistent application.”24 Its major findings conclude that “[w]ith the 
exception of nuclear DNA analysis, .	.	. no forensic method has been 
rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and 
a specific individual or source”25 and that “there is a notable dearth of 
peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific bases and 
validity of many forensic methods.”26 The NAS Report, which 
includes thirteen separate recommendations, implores the United 
States Congress to “[r]emove [forensic science services] from the 
 
 23. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9VR-ADYV] (describing the state of forensic evidence and the need 
for scientifically rigorous standards). The disciplines analyzed by the NAS Report were 
biological evidence (DNA analysis), controlled substances analysis, fingerprints (friction 
ridge analysis), pattern and impression evidence, tool mark and firearm identification, hair 
analysis, fiber evidence analysis, questioned document examination, paint and coatings 
analysis, explosives and fire analysis, forensic odontology (bite marks), bloodstain and 
pattern analysis, and digital and multimedia analysis. Id. at 3–4, 38. 
 24. Id. at xix. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. Id. at 8. 
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administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ 
offices”;27 “[d]evelop tools for advancing measurement, validation, 
reliability, information sharing, and proficiency testing .	.	. and to 
establish protocols for forensic examinations, methods, and 
practices.”28 The NAS Report further recommends that Congress 
require the mandatory accreditation of all forensic laboratories and 
certification for all forensic science practitioners,29 “[e]stablish a 
national code of ethics [with] .	.	. mechanisms of enforcement,”30 and 
create a National Institute of Forensic Sciences.31 
The NAS Report recommendations provoked the United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to establish the National Commission 
on Forensic Science (“NCFS”).32 Created in 2013, the NCFS was an 
independent federal advisory board composed of law enforcement 
agencies, forensic laboratory directors, scientists, forensic 
practitioners, judges, and lawyers, among others, charged with 
making recommendations “to enhance the practice and improve the 
reliability of forensic science.”33 Among other things, the NCFS 
crafted directives on proficiency training, accreditation and 
certification, and quality control practices.34 It also advised the 
Attorney General on forensic policy considerations.35 
In April 2017, then–Attorney General Jefferson Sessions III 
decided to disband the NCFS and shift certain of its functions to the 
DOJ.36 Attorney General Sessions thereby wrested forensic science 
from independent, nonpartisan, evidence-based oversight and 
returned control over its reliability and validity to a law enforcement 
agency. As United States District Court Judge and former NCFS 
Commissioner Jed Rakoff responded, “It is unrealistic to expect that 
 
 27. Id. at 24. 
 28. Id. at 24–25. 
 29. Id. at 215. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 19. 
 32. Rebecca McCray, Jeff Sessions’ Rejection of Science Leaves Local Prosecutors in 
the Dark, SLATE (June 7, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/06/
disbanding-the-ncfs-will-lead-to-worse-outcomes.html [https://perma.cc/KSA3-XJUF]; National 
Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs 
[https://perma.cc/AUU7-W57E]. 
 33. National Commission on Forensic Science, supra note 32. 
 34. SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS: CURBING WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES 189–90 (2015). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Janet Burns, Sessions Scraps Federal Commission on Forensic Accuracy, for Some 
Reason, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/ 
2017/04/11/sessions-scraps-federal-commission-on-forensic-accuracy-because-reasons/#3b7
9f88176c2 [https://perma.cc/H9E4-8Z68]. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
492 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
truly objective, scientifically sound standards for the use of forensic 
science .	.	. can be arrived at by entities centered solely within the 
Department of Justice.”37 
Resistance to enhancing the reliability and validity of the 
forensic science disciplines, however, is not unique to the recent 
Sessions DOJ. Then–Attorney General Loretta Lynch took a similar 
stance in 2016, refusing to adopt the findings of the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”).38 The 
PCAST report, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring 
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (the “PCAST 
Report”), concluded that several forensic disciplines lacked 
foundational scientific validity sufficient to support analyst claims, 
undermining years of convictions based on such evidence.39 The 
PCAST Report recommended that courts take into account actual 
scientific criteria when assessing the admissibility of forensic 
evidence40 and that the Attorney General “direct attorneys appearing 
on behalf of the [DOJ] to ensure expert testimony in court about 
forensic feature-comparison methods meets the scientific standards 
for scientific validity.”41 
On the very day PCAST released its report, Attorney General 
Lynch publicly denounced its findings and recommendations and 
declared that “the [DOJ] will not be adopting the recommendations 
related to the admissibility of forensic science evidence.”42 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) went even further, publicly 
 
 37. Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science Commission, 




 38. See Radley Balko, Opinion, When Obama Wouldn’t Fight for Science, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/04/when-
obama-wouldn’t-fight-for-science/?utm_term=.e8cf205d9d0e [https://perma.cc/RS8M-FLNE 
(dark archive)]. 
 39. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC 
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS, at x (2016) [hereinafter PCAST 
REPORT], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FC5-JLWN]. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. Id. at 18. 
 42. Gary Fields, White House Advisory Council Report Is Critical of Forensics Used in 
Criminal Trials; U.S. Attorney General Says Justice Department Won’t Adopt 
Recommendations, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
white-house-advisory-council-releases-report-critical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials-
1474394743 [https://perma.cc/5QTP-XXAR (dark archive)]. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
2019] EVIDENCE ON FIRE 493 
asserting its “disagree[ment] with many of the scientific assertions and 
conclusions of the report” and arguing that the report was flawed 
insofar as it failed to mention “numerous published research studies 
which seem to meet PCAST’s criteria for appropriately designed 
studies providing support for foundational validity.”43 
In response, PCAST invited the DOJ, FBI, and other 
stakeholders “to identify any ‘published .	.	. studies’ that had not been 
considered by PCAST and that established the validity and reliability 
of any of the forensic feature-comparison methods that the PCAST 
report found to lack such support.”44 In sharp contrast to the public 
statements the FBI had advanced in condemning the Report, the 
“DOJ ultimately concluded that it had no additional studies for 
PCAST to consider.”45 
The PCAST Report focused on feature-comparison forensic 
methods, including disciplines that “attempt to determine whether an 
evidentiary sample .	.	. is or is not associated with a potential ‘source’ 
sample .	.	. based on the presence of similar patterns, impressions, or 
other features in the sample and the source.”46 To this end, the report 
evaluated methods in six forensic disciplines: DNA analysis, bite 
marks, latent fingerprint analysis, firearm markings, footwear 
impressions, and hair microscopy.47 In evaluating these feature-
comparison methods, PCAST noted that “[w]ithout appropriate 
estimates of accuracy, an examiner’s statement that two samples are 
similar—or even indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it 
has no probative value, and considerable potential for prejudicial 
impact. Nothing—not personal experience nor professional 
practices—can substitute for adequate empirical demonstration of 
accuracy.”48 
The PCAST Report did not assess the validity or reliability of 
fire science, which is not a feature-comparison or “matching” science. 
This is because the reliability problems attendant to fire science differ 
 
 43. FBI, COMMENTS ON: PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/fbi-pcast-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE9V-B8FL]. 
 44. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
CRIMINAL COURTS 2–3 (2017) [hereinafter PCAST ADDENDUM] (internal citation 
omitted), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_forensics_addendum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ33-XMEM]. 
 45. Id. at 3. 
 46. PCAST REPORT, supra note 39, at 1. 
 47. Id. at x. 
 48. Id. at 143. 
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from those that infect the traditional comparison disciplines.49 While 
the matching sciences are prone to challenges regarding the 
appropriateness of statistical pools and the veracity of their accuracy 
and exclusion rates, fire science remains more elusive and less 
susceptible to scientific assessment. In fact, the National Fire 
Protection Association’s NFPA 1033: Standard for Professional 
Qualifications for Fire Investigator (“NFPA 1033”) requires fire 
investigators to have and maintain “an up-to-date basic knowledge of 
the following [seventeen] topics beyond the high school level”: fire 
science, fire chemistry, thermodynamics, thermometry, fire dynamics, 
explosion dynamics, computer fire modeling, fire investigation, fire 
analysis, fire investigation methodology, fire investigation technology, 
hazardous materials, failure analysis and analytical tools, fire 
protection systems, evidence documentation, collection and 
preservation, and electricity and electrical systems.50 
Unlike the matching sciences, fire science is an interpretative 
reconstruction science. In other words, “[f]ire investigation is a 
forensic science that is a world unto itself. The investigator who 
ventures [t]here risks exposure .	.	. to scientific, professional, and 
personal challenges not found in any other field of forensic science.”51 
Those challenges include the evaluation of fire-scene evidence 
that frequently is so degraded or destroyed that it is extremely 
difficult—if not impossible—to analyze. Unsurprisingly, research 
makes clear that investigations of fire origin are most accurate very 
early in the fire. For example, in a study comparing similar rooms that 
had burned for 30 seconds, 70 seconds, and 180 seconds past the onset 
of full-room involvement, or “flashover,”52 fire investigators 
accurately selected the room quadrant where the fire originated 84%, 
69%, and 25% of the time, respectively.53 In other words, a fire 
 
 49. See, e.g., Rachel Dioso-Villa, Scientific and Legal Developments in Fire and Arson 
Investigation Expertise in Texas v. Willingham, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 817, 821 (2013) 
(“Unlike other forensic sciences that attempt to match crime scene evidence with a unique 
source, such as fingerprints or DNA evidence, fire investigators interpret evidence and 
make conclusions as to whether the fire was accidental or intentionally set.”). 
 50. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 1033: STANDARD FOR PROFESSIONAL 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATOR ¶	1.3.7 (2014 ed. 2014) [hereinafter NFPA 
1033 (2014)]. 
 51. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 12, at xv. 
 52. HANGER, supra note 10, at 3 (“[Flashover] is the moment when the fire gases 
trapped below the ceiling of a room reach 500–600°C (932–1112°F), so hot that every 
ignitable surface in a room will burst into flames. At this point, a fire in a room becomes a 
room on fire, and the investigator’s job becomes exponentially tougher.”). 
 53. Parisa Dehghani-Tafti & Paul Bieber, Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of 
Arson Investigation and Innocence Claims, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 549, 566 (2016). 
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investigator’s ability to accurately determine fire origin at 180 seconds 
past flashover is no better than chance. We discuss the importance of 
the development of reliable error rates applicable to fire science 
origin and cause determinations in more detail in Part III of this 
Article. 
II.  THE GOOD: NFPA 921 AND CIVIL CASE EXPERT REVIEW 
Historically, American courts admitted faulty fire-science 
evidence in both civil and criminal cases due to a lack of disciplinary 
scientific expertise.54 Once evidence-based fire experiments evolved 
to disprove fire investigators’ long-held folk wisdom, however, civil 
litigants were quick to challenge unreliable fire evidence. Criminal 
defendants, on the other hand, largely limited their challenges to fire 
science to habeas corpus proceedings—that is, postconviction civil 
petitions. In the following subsections, we discuss several positive 
developments pertinent to fire-science evidence, including the 
promulgation of the National Fire Protection Association’s treatise 
on fire and explosion investigations (“NFPA 921”) and civil courts’ 
adoption of NFPA 921 as the “gold standard” in assessing the 
reliability of fire-investigation evidence. 
A. NFPA 921: The Gold Standard in Fire Investigation 
The National Fire Protection Association’s NFPA 921: Guide for 
Fire and Explosion Investigations is the single most important and 
reformative treatise in the field of fire investigation.55 NFPA 921 is a 
guidebook “developed by the Technical Committee on Fire 
Investigations to assist in improving the fire investigation process and 
the quality of information on fires resulting from that process.”56 
NFPA 921 “establish[ed] guidelines and recommendations for the 
safe and systematic investigation or analysis of fire and explosion 
incidents.”57 It is “intended for use by both public sector employees 
who [are responsible] for fire investigation and private sector persons 
 
 54. See generally John J. Lentini, “Progress” in Fire Investigation: Moving from 
Witchcraft and Folklore to the Misuse of Models and the Abuse of Science (unpublished 
manuscript), http://firescientist.com/Documents/NewOrder/2010%20%E2%80%9CProgress%
E2%80%9D%20in%20Fire%20Investigation-From%20Witchcraft%20to%20the%20
Misuse%20of%20Science-John%20Lentini.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJT9-K5CQ] (detailing 
older methodologies in fire science and their flaws). 
 55. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 12, at 13. 
 56. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS, at 921-1 (2017 ed. 2017) [hereinafter NFPA 921 (2017)]. 
 57. Id. ¶	1.2.1. 
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[who conduct] investigations for insurance companies or litigation 
purposes.”58 
Advances in fire science, such as the NFPA guidelines, first 
published in 1992, have undermined hundreds of faulty arson 
determinations and exposed fire investigation as a leading cause of 
wrongful convictions in the United States.59 The NFPA standards are 
taught at the National Fire Academy, and NFPA 921 is widely 
regarded today as the gold standard for fire investigation within the 
field.60 The NFPA 921 guidelines were established to ensure scientific 
reliability.61 Thus, NFPA 921 requires fire investigators to use the 
“scientific method [as] a principle of inquiry that forms a basis for 
legitimate scientific and engineering processes, including fire incident 
investigation.”62 NFPA 921 methodology involves several steps, 
including the collection of data, analysis of data using inductive 
reasoning, development of a hypothesis, and testing of the 
hypothesis.63 
NFPA 921 also requires investigators to avoid “eliminat[ing] a 
potential ignition source merely because there is no obvious evidence 
for it.”64 In other words, an investigator must have definite evidence 
that the fire was not started by a particular cause before he or she is 
permitted to rule out that cause.65 Moreover, while investigative 
 
 58. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS, at 921-1 (2011 ed. 2011) [hereinafter NFPA 921 (2011)] (emphasis 
added). 
 59. See, e.g., Stephanie Chen, Junk Science? Another Inmate on Death Row Fights to 
Disprove Arson, CNN (Aug. 12, 2010, 10:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/08/12/
pennsylvania.arson.dougherty.case/index.html?hpt=C1 [https://perma.cc/7DCE-7BME] 
(“In the last two decades, advances in arson science have spurred some investigators and 
lawyers to question past arson convictions. Some attorneys estimate dozens or even 
hundreds of cases may have been based on faulty arson science.”). 
 60. Although the development and adoption of NFPA 921 has operated to improve 
the reliability of fire investigation, the guidelines would benefit from certain reforms. See 
infra Part V. 
 61. See Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited: Percolation 
Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 483, 492 (2016) (“Noting ‘the perception of a profession plagued by 
misconceptions,’ the Standards Council of the NFPA formed a Technical Committee on 
Fire Investigations in 1985. ‘After 7 years, the first edition of NFPA 921, Guide for Fire 
and Explosion Investigations, was released.’ [NFPA 921 was] [i]ntended to ‘assist in 
improving the fire investigation process and the quality of information on fires resulting 
from the fire investigation process.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC 
PROTOCOLS, supra note 12, at 13)). 
 62. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶	4.3. 
 63. Id. ¶	3.3.160. 
 64. Id. ¶	19.5. 
 65. See id. 
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observation of the evidence is one of the steps in the NFPA 
methodology, investigator observation, standing alone, is insufficient 
to produce a scientifically reliable conclusion.66 NFPA 921 is updated 
regularly and reflects the most reliable scientific investigatory 
procedures and methodologies applicable to fire science.67 
Since the publication of NFPA 921, numerous courts have held 
that expert fire evidence that fails to comport with its guidelines is 
inadmissible.68 Unfortunately, every one of those decisions involved a 
 
 66. Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An 
“Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 299, 359 (2007) (“Casual 
or mere observation is [only one] aspect of the scientific method [and] is insufficient, 
standing alone, to draw valid inferences.”). 
 67. NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION 
ASS’N, https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-
standards/detail?code=921 [https://perma.cc/U3WW-PPC8] (showing that the most recent 
edition of NFPA 921 was published in 2017). 
 68. See Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
although NFPA standards are not controlling, if the investigators purport to use NFPA 
921, they need to “reliably apply” NFPA instructions); Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. Am. 
Household, Inc., 429 F.3d 469, 478 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the district court’s exclusion 
of fire investigation causation testimony where a fire investigator failed “to exclude ‘[a]ll 
other reasonable origins and causes’” as mandated by NFPA 921 (alteration in original) 
(quoting NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS ¶	2-3.6 (1998 ed. 1998))); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 
394 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the fire investigators failed to apply an NFPA 921 evidentiary 
standard reliably to the facts of the case); Werth v. Hill-Rom, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 
1060 (D. Minn. 2012) (excluding expert-fire-investigator testimony due to the expert’s 
failure to rely on NFPA 921 and, in so doing, stating that “[s]imply put, the experts’ failure 
to disclose their reliance on NFPA 921—in their initial Report, their Supplemental 
Report, their depositions, or at any other point in discovery—would alone justify 
excluding their opinion”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Indus. Paper & Packaging Corp., No. 
3:02–CV–491, 2006 WL 1788967, at *4–5 (E.D. Tenn. June 27, 2006) (denying, in part, 
motion in limine to exclude fire-expert testimony where expert methodology was 
“consistent with NFPA 921”); Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., No. 03-4195-JAR, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16306, at *31 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005) (allowing admission, in part, of 
evidence because the investigator’s methodology comported with NFPA 921 standards); 
Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 707, 725 (W.D. Va. 2004) (concluding that the 
expert’s testimony “was based on his investigation of the cause of the fire, an investigation 
which was conducted in accordance with the professional standards and scientific 
methodology .	.	. set forth in NFPA 921”); TNT Rd. Co. v. Sterling Truck Corp., No. 03-
37-B-K, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13463, at *9, *17–18 (D. Me. July 19, 2004) (allowing 
admission of evidence that “substantially complied with the NFPA standard”); Ind. Ins. v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851–53 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that reliance on a 
“suspect investigation .	.	. impugns the reliability of [the expert’s] analysis”); Royal Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Joseph Daniel Constr., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 423, 426–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A 
comparison of [the expert’s] methodology and the six steps of the NFPA 921 methodology 
reveals that his conclusions were based on these recognized standards and not merely his 
subjective belief.”); Snodgrass v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-1814(JBS), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13421, at *48, *56–57 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2002) (allowing expert to testify to his 
opinions on fire causation as long as said opinions did not rely on unreliable statistics); 
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civil litigant’s challenge to a civil opponent’s proffered expert fire 
evidence.69 For reasons discussed below, NFPA 921 has received a 
noticeably chillier reception from law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
criminal courts. 
B. Fire Experts’ Resistance to Change 
NFPA 921 initially faced strong resistance from fire 
investigators.70 Moreover, and despite the exposure of faulty fire 
evidence in civil litigation, fire investigators continue to combat the 
call to change how they conduct their investigations and reach their 
origin and causation conclusions.71 Ironically, because it is well 
documented that unsound fire investigations have contributed to 
miscarriages of justice, fire investigators may feel besmirched and, as 
such, insist on defending the discipline against criticism instead of 
making strides to improve its reliability and validity.72 
The DOJ released a report in 2000 entitled Fire and Arson Scene 
Evidence: A Guide for Public Safety Personnel, which endorsed 
NFPA 921 as a “benchmark for the training and expertise of everyone 
who purports to be an expert in the origin and cause determination of 
fires.”73 The International Association of Arson Investigators 
(“IAAI”) begrudgingly followed suit.74 The guidelines nonetheless 
 
Chester Valley Coach Works v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 99 CV 4197, 2001 WL 1160012, at 
*8–13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2001) (noting that an expert’s deviations from NFPA 921 
methodologies gave the court “serious doubts as to the .	.	. conclusions that [the expert] 
reached”); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 365–66 (D. 
Conn. 2001) (remarking that an expert’s methods were consistent with “the principles of 
NFPA 921”). 
 69. See cases cited supra note 68 (listing civil cases involving fire evidence). 
 70. See JOHN J. LENTINI, THE EVOLUTION OF FIRE INVESTIGATION, 1977–2011, at 2 
(n.d.), http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/The%20Evolution%20of%20Fire%20
Investigation,%201977-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKA2-F4GV] (“To state that NFPA 
921 was not immediately embraced by the fire investigation profession would be a serious 
understatement. In fact, the howls of protest from fire investigation ‘professionals’ were 
deafening.”). 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. See Steve Mills, Convicted Arsonist Hopes Science Proves Innocence, CHI. TRIB., 
May 18, 2015, at 1 (reporting that “in many jurisdictions, [NFPA 921 guidelines] were slow 
to take hold, as veteran investigators clung to what now are considered disproven 
theories” and “[i]n some police and fire departments, investigators were openly hostile to 
the updated science”). 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181584, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE EVIDENCE: A 
GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL 6 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
181584.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY25-XEWK]. 
 74. In what can be fairly characterized as its most accepting statement, the IAAI 
explained that NFPA 921 is “an important reference manual, and sets forth guidance and 
methodology regarding the determination of the origin and cause of fires.” NFPA 
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continue to be ignored by fire investigators in criminal cases.75 The 
purpose of NFPA 921 was to reform fire investigation on the front 
end in order to ensure a greater likelihood of obtaining accurate 
information.76 Without fire investigator implementation, therefore, 
the NFPA 921 standards become meaningless, save attempts to 
challenge the admissibility of flawed fire science once the case 
proceeds to litigation. 
C. Exclusion of Faulty Fire Science in Civil Cases 
NFPA 921 acts as a shield against the admissibility of faulty fire 
evidence in civil cases. We highlight how junk science, which is 
inadmissible in civil cases, permeates criminal proceedings in the first 
piece of this trilogy, Discovering Forensic Fraud.77 In that essay, we 
explain that, notwithstanding the transsubstantive nature of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that pertain to expert evidence, “judges 
are far more willing to fulfill their gatekeeping roles in civil cases than 
[in] criminal ones.”78 We queried why judges, who routinely exclude 
highly technical scientific evidence in civil cases, seemed incapable of 
performing their gatekeeping function in criminal cases involving 
“scientific” forensic evidence. As we noted, the trend in criminal 
cases is for the courts to continue to admit the same unreliable 
evidence in case after case and long after the relevant scientific 
community has rebuked the validity of that evidence. Forensic 
odontology or “bite mark” evidence is perhaps the most well-known 
example of forensic evidence that has been thoroughly discredited by 
the scientific community and, yet, has been admitted in every criminal 
trial in the nation in which it has been offered.79 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court of the United States established 
that trial judges are gatekeepers, tasked with determining as a 
threshold matter the reliability of an experts’ principles, techniques, 
and methods.80 In its opinion, the Court abandoned the Frye general 
 
921/1033 Position Statement, INT’L ASS’N ARSON INVESTIGATORS (Jan. 12, 2013), 
https://www.firearson.com/NFPA-9211033-Position-Statement/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Z4EP-RPCV]. 
 75. See Lentini, Mythology of Arson Investigation, supra note 9, at 1. 
 76. NFPA 921 (2011), supra note 58, at 921-1. 
 77. Oliva & Beety, supra note 22, at 123–24, 137–38. 
 78. Id. at 126. 
 79. Radley Balko, Opinion, Incredibly, Prosecutors are Still Defending Bite Mark 
Evidence, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2017/01/30/incredibly-prosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_
term=.ceaf8e778156 [https://perma.cc/WGN7-5KGT (dark archive)]. 
 80. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
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acceptance test,81 thereby shifting the burden of assessing the 
reliability of scientific testimony from the relevant scientific 
community to judges.82 While a minority of the states continue to 
retain the Frye test, the overwhelming majority have adopted 
Daubert.83 
In 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides the 
federal standard for the admissibility of “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge,”84 was amended to codify the Daubert 
trilogy.85 Specifically, Rule 702 was amended to require trial judges to 
conduct a preliminary assessment of the methodology supporting an 
expert’s findings and testimony to determine whether they are valid 
and whether the methodology can be reasonably applied in the case.86 
The rule has been interpreted as precluding a trial court from 
“subject[ing] the jury .	.	. to confusing and misleading 
‘pseudoscientific’ research.”87 
As previously noted, civil courts routinely exclude unreliable 
fire-science testimony under Rule 702. As a result, junk fire science 
has been inadmissible for decades in civil cases. Insurance companies, 
product manufacturers, and other interested civil parties have 
thoroughly and successfully attacked disreputable, nonscientific 
evidentiary proffers.88 Civil courts also exclude untrustworthy fire-
science evidence that goes to a fire’s origin and causation, while 
criminal courts routinely permit prosecutors to admit the same 
evidence in arson trials.89 
 
 81. Id. at 591–93. The Frye test required judges to admit expert evidence so long as 
that evidence was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 82. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
 83. South Carolina and North Dakota have their own reliability determinations, and 
neither has adopted Daubert or Frye. Daubert and Frye in the 50 States, JURILYTICS, 
https://jurilytics.com/50-state-overview [https://perma.cc/L6NW-SND3]. 
 84. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment. The Daubert 
trilogy includes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137 (1999). 
 86. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if .	.	. 
the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”). 
 87. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (S.D. W. Va. 1998). 
 88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 77; discussion infra Part III. 
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For example, in Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. American Household, Inc.,90 
an elderly woman died in a fire while she was using an electric blanket 
in her Preston County, West Virginia, apartment.91 The fire 
investigator, who the court described as “employed by the West 
Virginia State Fire Marshall’s [sic] Office” but “not certified as a fire 
investigator,” concluded that the victim’s electric blanket started the 
fire.92 As a result, the deceased woman’s estate filed a lawsuit against 
the electric blanket manufacturer.93 The district court ruled that the 
plaintiff’s proffered fire-science testimony was unreliable and 
inadmissible under Daubert and granted the defendant-manufacturer 
judgment as a matter of law.94 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that plaintiff’s expert 
testimony—contending that the blanket had caused the fire—was 
inadmissible under Daubert because plaintiff’s expert had failed to 
eliminate all other possible origin sources.95 The court noted that the 
fire investigator made no effort to physically examine other potential 
sources, such as a lamp, a candle, a cord found on the decedent’s arm, 
a wall outlet, and the wall outlet wiring.96 Accordingly, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the investigator did not employ a methodology that 
was consistent with NFPA standards, “which require investigators to 
‘exclude all other reasonable origins and causes.’”97 Because “Daubert 
aims to prevent expert speculation,” the court held that the 
investigator’s conclusions of the fire origin source were unreliable.98 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
similarly held that expert fire-science testimony must be excluded 
when the fire investigation fails to reliably apply the appropriate 
methodology to the facts of the case.99 In Presley v. Lakewood 
Engineering & Manufacturing Co.,100 the plaintiff’s fire-science 
investigator concluded that a manufacturing defect in a space heater 
 
 90. 429 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 91. Id. at 471. 
 92. Id. at 472–73. 
 93. Id. at 471. 
 94. Id. at 471, 474. 
 95. Id. at 478. 
 96. Id. at 472–73. The fire investigator also failed to use the scientific method to reach 
his conclusion that the electric blanket was the cause of the fire. Id. 473–74. 
 97. Id. at 478 (quoting NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS ¶	2-3.6 (1998 ed. 1998)). 
 98. Id. at 477. 
 99. Presley v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 553 F.3d 638, 645–47 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 100. 553 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2009). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
502 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
caused the house fire at issue.101 The investigator testified that he 
neither tested the heater to verify that conclusion nor attempted to 
eliminate several potential alternative causes of the fire.102 The Eighth 
Circuit determined that the expert failed to reliably apply the 
standards of NFPA 921 to the facts of the case and that the expert’s 
“fire spread theory was inconsistent with NFPA 921.”103 In affirming 
the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert testimony, the 
court explained that the fire investigator’s “applications of general 
observations and general science .	.	. led to ‘vague theorizing based 
upon general principles’” and, as such, was unreliable under 
Daubert.104 As explained below, criminal courts have been far less 
enamored with NFPA 921 than their civil counterparts, and, as a 
result, criminal defendants are often precluded from challenging 
unreliable fire-science evidence until they petition for habeas relief. 
III.  THE BAD: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
In contrast to the consistent exclusion of fallacious fire science in 
civil cases, state and federal criminal courts frequently admit such 
evidence. Worse yet, innocent people have been charged, convicted, 
imprisoned and even executed for crimes they did not commit on the 
basis of flimsy and unreliable fire evidence.105 As the case law 
illustrates, such miscarriages of justice begin and end with a fire 
investigator’s testimony identifying the alleged origin and cause of the 
fire. The fire expert determines, for example, whether the defendant 
fell asleep with a cigarette,106 and therefore accidentally caused the 
fire, or maliciously rigged a toaster to intentionally start a house fire 
in order to commit murder.107 Perhaps most troubling are the cases in 
which fire experts contended that they found “proof” of accelerants 
at the scene and, operating under that faulty assumption, deduced 
 
 101. Id. at 640–41. 
 102. Id. at 642. 
 103. Id. at 645–46. 
 104. Id. at 646–47 (quoting Pro Serv. Auto., L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp., 469 F.3d 1210, 1216 
(8th Cir. 2006)). 
 105. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (examining the role that 
faulty forensic science has played in wrongful convictions). 
 106. See Babick v. Berghuis, No. 1:03–cv–20, 2008 WL 282166, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 
29, 2008). 
 107. Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 869–70 (W. Va. 2016). In this bizarre case, a 
volunteer firefighter determined that defendant Sam Anstey had maliciously rigged a 
toaster to start the fire when there was no evidence whatsoever to support such a 
conclusion. Id. at 870. Sam Anstey was sentenced to life in prison for murder by arson. Id. 
at 873. 
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that the defendant intentionally set the fire.108 In one such case, these 
“findings” were later proven to be false and those defendants’ 
convictions were overturned—but not before they had spent decades 
behind bars for crimes they did not commit.109 
A. Admissibility of Faulty Fire Evidence in Criminal Cases 
The irrelevance of Daubert to the federal courts’ assessment of 
scientific evidence in criminal cases has been well chronicled.110 Even 
the 2009 NAS Report criticized the judiciary for falling down on its 
gatekeeping function in criminal cases, stating, “In a number of 
forensic science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to 
establish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their 
conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing 
this problem.”111 “Daubert has done little to improve the use of 
forensic science evidence in criminal cases.”112 Indeed, the NAS 
Report noted the unjustified discrepancy in the admissibility 
standards that courts apply to expert evidence in civil and criminal 
cases, observing that “ironically, the appellate courts appear to be 
more willing to second-guess trial court judgments on the 
admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in 
criminal cases.”113 
 
 108. See, e.g., Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. June 13, 2014), adopting report and recommendation sub nom. Lee v. Tennis, 
No. 4:CV–08–1972, 2014 WL 3900230 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Han Tak 
Lee v. Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 109. Id. 
 110. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000) (“[T]he heightened 
standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to 
expand, but .	.	. expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has been largely 
insulated from any change in pre-Daubert standards or approach.”); see also Jennifer L. 
Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State 
and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 (2002) (reviewing 
reported criminal cases and finding that “the Daubert decision did not impact .	.	. the 
admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial or .	.	. appellate court levels”); Peter 
J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions 
for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2005) (“An analysis of post-Daubert 
decisions demonstrates that whereas civil defendants prevail in their Daubert challenges, 
most of the time criminal defendants almost always lose their challenges to government 
proffers.”). 
 111. NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 53. 
 112. Id. at 106. The National Research Committee found that “trial judges rarely 
exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by prosecutors.” Id. at 11. 
 113. Id. at 11; see also J. Nancy Gertner, Commentary, The Need for a Research 
Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790 (2011). 
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As exposed by Professor Giannelli in his recent article, Forensic 
Science: Daubert’s Failure, criminal courts continue to admit fire 
evidence grounded in discredited forensic techniques in arson cases.114 
He explains that the 2009 Texas Forensic Science Commission 
Report, which concluded that fire investigations that led to two 
separate Texas arson convictions and which failed to “comport with 
either the modern standard of care expressed by NFPA 921, or the 
standard of care expressed by fire investigation texts and papers in the 
period 1980–1992,”115 “did more than the courts to curb flawed arson 
testimony.”116 Professor Giannelli characterized criminal courts’ 
ongoing refusal to “appl[y] the ‘exacting’ standard that the Supreme 
Court said Daubert demanded”117 to flawed forensic evidence, 
including faulty fire science, as a systemic failure of the judiciary.118 
Giannelli attributes this failure, in part, to the lack of regular access to 
independent scientific expertise in criminal cases, along with the 
routine admission of forensic evidence without foundational research, 
and forensic testimony dominated by “overstated and misleading 
conclusions.”119 
B. Wrongful Convictions and Habeas Corpus Decisions 
As noted above, unreliable fire-science testimony is routinely 
admitted in criminal cases.120 Inexplicably, the courts’ limited scrutiny 
of fire science’s reliability has been confined to civil proceedings, 
specifically, postconviction habeas corpus review. To succeed on such 
review, petitioners are required to show that the admission of faulty 
fire expert testimony “‘undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the 
entire trial’ .	.	. because ‘the probative value of [the fire expert] 
evidence, though relevant, is greatly outweighed by the prejudice to 
the accused from its admission.’”121 Han Tak Lee v. Glunt122 is a 
 
 114. See Giannelli, supra note 8, at 889–901 (summarizing several faulty methods of 
arson investigation and recent cases in which prosecution experts have relied on these 
methods). 
 115. Id. at 894 (quoting CRAIG L. BEYLER, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES USED IN THE CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST 
EARNEST RAY WILLIS AND CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM 51 (2009)). 
 116. Id. at 901. 
 117. Id. at 875 (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000)). 
 118. Id. at 937. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 121. Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 (3d Cir. 2012) (first quoting Keller v. 
Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001); then quoting Bisaccia v. Attorney Gen., 623 F.2d 
307, 313 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 122. 667 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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seminal fire-science case in which the petitioner satisfied that 
demanding standard of review.123 
Han Tak Lee was “charged with first degree murder and arson 
after his twenty-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a cabin fire at a 
religious retreat in the Pocono Mountains.”124 Lee was found guilty on 
both counts by a jury and sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole.125 Lee litigated his innocence for seventeen years before finally 
obtaining federal habeas corpus review by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit.126 
Lee asked the Third Circuit to reverse the district court’s denial 
of his request for an evidentiary hearing to present newly discovered 
expert evidence challenging the “fundamentally unreliable” fire 
science that had been admitted at his trial.127 In granting that request 
for relief, the Third Circuit found that there exists “a prima facie case 
for granting [a petitioner] habeas relief on his due process claim” if 
his allegations show that the state’s “fire expert testimony 
undermined the fundamental fairness of [his] entire trial because the 
testimony was premised on unreliable science and was therefore itself 
unreliable.”128 Along the way, the Third Circuit emphasized that the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had “not offered any evidence 
supporting the validity of the old [fire-science] methodology and d[id] 
not challenge the accuracy of [Lee’s expert’s] affidavit, which 
describes the developments in fire science since Lee’s trial and 
explains that many of the scientific theories relied upon by the 
Commonwealth’s experts have been refuted.”129 
On remand, the federal district court opened its report and 
recommendation with the ancient Chinese proverb “[s]low and 
painful has been man’s progress from magic to law,” explaining that it 
“is a fitting metaphor for both the progress of the law and the history 
of this case.”130 The district court held that Lee had “show[n] that the 
 
 123. Id. at 403–08. 
 124. Id. at 400. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 400–02 (detailing Han Tak Lee’s efforts to litigate his innocence through the 
court system). 
 127. Id. at 407 (“Lee avers that his expert will conclude that there is no support for the 
conclusion that the fire was intentionally set if he is given the opportunity to analyze the 
fire scene evidence and apply the principles known through the new developments in fire 
science to that physical evidence.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
June 13, 2014) (“This proverb, inscribed at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on 
the statue of Hseih–Chai, a mythological Chinese beast who was endowed with the faculty 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
506 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental 
fairness of the entire trial” and vacated his conviction and sentence.131 
In reaching that result, the court concluded as follows: 
Today, with the benefit of extraordinary progress in human 
knowledge regarding fire science over the past two decades it is 
now uncontested that this fire science evidence—which was a 
critical component in the quantum of proof that led to Lee’s 
conviction—is invalid, and that much of what was presented to 
Lee’s jury as science is now conceded to be little more than 
superstition.132 
Challenges to questionable forensic science convictions grounded 
in “change-in-science” theories are increasingly common in civil 
habeas proceedings.133 For example, in People v. Babick,134 a Michigan 
circuit court vacated the petitioner’s arson conviction because the 
“body of scientific knowledge and expert opinion that now exists 
regarding cause and origin of arson fires” made it probable that the 
petitioner would be acquitted in a new trial.135 In sum, although 
criminal defendants continue to be convicted today as the result of 
criminal courts’ admission of faulty fire evidence at trial, the modern 
revolution in fire science provides petitioners with an arsenal of 
evidentiary ammunition to challenge those convictions on habeas 
review. As Federal Magistrate Judge Carlson explained in Han Tak 
Lee v. Tennis, “To achieve justice, the law must serve as the vehicle 
 
of discerning the guilty, is a fitting metaphor for both the progress of the law and the 
history of this case.”), adopting report and recommendation sub nom. Lee v. Tennis, No. 
4:CV–08–1972, 2014 WL 3900230 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Han Tak Lee v. 
Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 131. Id. at *19 (quoting Glunt, 667 F.3d at 403). 
 132. Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247, 1249–50, 1266 (Mass. 2016) 
(holding that defendant was “deprived of a defense from the confluence of counsel’s 
failure to find .	.	. an expert and the evolving scientific research that demonstrates that a 
credible expert could offer important evidence in support of this defense”); Ex parte 
Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (granting habeas applicant’s request 
for relief based on new expert medical testimony). 
 134. No. 1996-2562 FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2014). 
 135. Id. at 12. At trial, the investigators testified that during their investigations there 
was a “perceived use of accelerants, multiple points of origin, burn patterns and/or dog 
sniffing hits.” Id. at 3. In postconviction proceedings, the defendant’s attorney claimed that 
“the fire science in use by experts at the time caused everyone to believe the fire was an 
arson as opposed to being accidentally caused.” Id. at 4. A certified arson investigator lent 
credence to her claim, explaining that the original investigators “fail[ed] to adhere to the 
protocol in NFPA 921, and, based on all the evidence, the cause and origin of the fire 
should be classified as ‘undetermined.’” Id. at 8. For a thorough discussion of the Babick 
trial and subsequent proceedings, see Plummer & Syed, supra note 61, at 486–90. 
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through which imperfect institutions strive for greater justice through 
a more perfect understanding of the truth. Therefore, as our 
understanding of scientific truth grows and changes, the law must 
follow the truth in order to secure justice.”136 This understanding of 
scientific truth likewise means that more trial courts should seriously 
consider excluding faulty fire evidence pretrial, rather than years—or 
decades—later in postconviction review.137 
C. Wrongful Convictions and Fire Science 
As Han Tak Lee, Babick, and the cases catalogued at the 
National Registry of Exonerations138 demonstrate, faulty fire science 
is to blame for a significant number of wrongful convictions across the 
United States. Indeed, the AAAS, which includes noted fire-science 
expert and critic John Lentini, hypothesizes that the number of 
wrongful arson convictions secured as a result of the admissibility of 
invalidated fire science runs in the hundreds.139 The high error rate in 
these cases is likely attributable to the undoubtedly persuasive power 
that expert fire-science evidence—no matter how flawed—has over 
juries.140 As a result, it is particularly important that criminal courts 
begin to enforce their Daubert evidentiary gatekeeping function in 
arson prosecutions. Several problems persist in arson investigations 
that lead to wrongful convictions and could be exposed via a robust 
 
 136. Tennis, 2014 WL 3894306, at *19. 
 137. See Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Criminal Procedure v. Scientific Process: 
The Challenging Path to Post-Conviction Relief in Cases that Arise During Periods of Shift 
in Science, 41 VT. L. REV. 279, 291–92 (2016) (“Ultimately and reluctantly, the Court is 
persuaded that the deficits of the conclusions reached by either expert are significant 
enough in terms of reliability and crucial enough in terms of relevance to bar their 
presentation to the jury. The Court is keenly aware of the consequences of its ruling, the 
impact of which may ultimately jeopardize prosecution of this matter. However, these 
omissions are so fundamental, confounding and distressing that the Court is left with little 
choice but to grant Defendant’s motion to preclude admissibility of such experts’ opinions, 
despite acknowledging that it would have been far simpler to have allowed presentment of 
such viewpoints to the jury, particularly when considering such matters under the old [pre-
Daubert] standard.” (quoting State v. Gibson, No. CR20104390-001 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 
25, 2013))). 
 138. Browse Cases, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx [https://perma.cc/W692-MZ8K]. 
 139. HANGER, supra note 10, at 5. 
 140. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 
19, 23–24 (2007) (explaining that “jurors themselves have identified the task of 
interpreting scientific and technical evidence and expert testimony as particularly 
challenging” and “[c]ase studies examining juror comprehension of scientific testimony, 
and some experimental research, point out the types of expert evidence that can present 
problems for juries” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Daubert challenge, including the use of negative corpus theory and 
investigatory techniques that are likely to compound error. 
1.  Negative Corpus Theory 
A common investigative theory in arson cases is that the fire was 
caused by an “open flame,” that is, that a human with an igniter 
intentionally started the fire.141 This hypothesis is often based on 
“negative corpus” theory, which operates as follows: 
A fire investigator determines, for instance, that a fire began in 
the northeast corner of the living room. A search of the 
northeast corner reveals no evidence of the ignition source that 
started the fire. Based on an absence of an ignition source 
commonly associated with an accidental fire (such as a heater, 
electric lamp, extension cord, cigarettes, or candles), the fire 
investigator, using the process of elimination, decides that the 
fire must have been ignited with a match or a lighter that was 
then removed from the scene.142 
Negative corpus theory is thereby used to establish the necessary 
intent for arson.143 The fire investigator testifies that the fire was 
caused by the intentional lighting of a specific ignition source, such as 
a match or a lighter, in the absence of any evidence of said ignition 
source.144 Of course, if the fire expert identifies the wrong area of the 
scene as the source of the fire—the corner of the room without any 
electrical outlets as opposed to the other corner with the charred 
space heater—then it goes without saying that no evidence will be 
recovered that supports the notion that the fire actually started in 
another location. NFPA 921 explicitly rejects the application of 
negative corpus theory because it runs afoul of the scientific 
method.145 Fire investigators, however, continue to provide expert 
conclusions based on this absence-of-evidence theory.146 
 
 141. Dehghani-Tafti & Bieber, supra note 53, at 570–71. 
 142. Id. at 571. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶	19.6.5 (“Identifying the ignition source for a 
fire by believing to have eliminated all ignition sources found, known, or suspected to have 
been present in the area of origin, and for which no supporting evidence exists, is referred 
to by some investigators as negative corpus. .	.	. [Negative corpus] is not consistent with the 
scientific method, is inappropriate, and should not be used because it generates untestable 
hypotheses, and may result in incorrect determinations of the ignition source and first fuel 
ignited.”). 
 146. Dehghani-Tafti & Bieber, supra note 53, at 571. 
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Exacerbating the negative corpus problem is the well-
documented fact that fire experts are notoriously inept at determining 
the source of a fire.147 A 2005 study conducted by the DOJ Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) found that only 
6% of fire experts accurately identified the fire origin in a room that 
had burned two minutes past flashover.148 The ATF study was 
repeated by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, which 
recorded fire investigator accuracy results ranging from 8% to 10%.149 
These abysmal error rates notwithstanding, criminal courts continue 
to admit expert testimony concluding that a fire, which started in an 
area that lacks any ascertainable ignition source, was man-made: 
arson.150 
In addition, the misidentification of the origin of a fire infects the 
remainder of the investigation. As NFPA 921 makes explicit, if a fire 
expert is incapable of identifying the true area of origin, then the 
expert simply cannot accurately determine the cause of the fire.151 
Furthermore, fire investigators often confine their search for a fire 
source to the alleged area of origin. Given the importance of 
accurately determining the area of fire origin, fire investigators should 
be required to examine and analyze the entire scene.152 
2.  Compounding Errors in Wrongful Convictions 
The potential for error compounds exponentially when faulty fire 
science intersects with other unreliable evidence in criminal cases. 
Flawed fire-science evidence, for example, frequently intersects with 
eyewitness misidentifications. NFPA 921 expressly permits fire 
investigators to interview eyewitnesses prior to examining the fire 
scene.153 When a fire investigator communicates with the eyewitnesses 
prior to conducting any on-scene fire investigation, however, 
eyewitness accounts have the potential to drastically—and 
unscientifically—impact the investigator’s findings, including his 
determinations regarding point of origin and nature of the fire 
 
 147. Id. at 566–67. 
 148. Id. at 566. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Giannelli, supra note 8, at 889–98 (summarizing several faulty methods of 
arson investigation and recent cases in which prosecution experts have relied on these 
methods). 
 151. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶	18.1 (“Generally, if the origin cannot be 
determined, the cause cannot be determined, and generally, if the correct origin is not 
identified, the subsequent cause determination will also be incorrect.”). 
 152. Id. ¶¶	18.3.1.3–.4. 
 153. Id. ¶	18.1.2.	
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
510 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
(accidental or intentional). Unfortunately, unreliable eyewitness 
commentary can provoke a fire investigator to conclude that a fire 
was intentionally set before the investigator has performed any on-
scene evidence collection or assessment.154 
Worse yet, eyewitnesses are notoriously prone to change or alter 
their memories of pertinent events when police or other first 
responders inform them that “scientific evidence” supports a 
particular theory of the fire under investigation.155 In fact, this is 
precisely what occurred in the arson investigation and prosecution of 
Cameron Todd Willingham. At the onset of the Willingham 
investigation, multiple eyewitnesses to the blaze reported to police 
that Willingham was frantic to save his daughters from their burning 
trailer.156 Once Willingham was suspected of arson, however, those 
eyewitnesses dramatically altered their accounts of what had occurred 
at the scene: 
Police and fire investigators canvassed the neighborhood, 
interviewing witnesses. Several, like Father Monaghan, initially 
portrayed Willingham as devastated by the fire. Yet, over time, 
an increasing number of witnesses offered damning statements. 
Diane Barbee said that she had not seen Willingham try to 
enter the house until after the authorities arrived, as if he were 
putting on a show. And when the children’s room exploded 
with flames, she added, he seemed more preoccupied with his 
car, which he moved down the driveway. Another neighbor 
reported that when Willingham cried out for his babies he “did 
not appear to be excited or concerned.” Even Father 
Monaghan wrote in a statement that, upon further reflection, 
“things were not as they seemed. I had the feeling that 
[Willingham] was in complete control.”157 
 
 154. Cf. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 16–17 (2002) (noting “anchoring effects” where individuals’ estimates are 
improperly influenced by preexisting, or predetermined, but task-irrelevant, data). 
 155. George Castelle & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Misinformation and Wrongful 
Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 17, 17–18 
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (“More important, while our 
study reveals errors in the collection of physical evidence and the testing and reporting of 
forensic science results, it also considers the poorly understood effect of the cross-
contamination of evidence: when one piece of misinformation contaminates other 
information in a case and ultimately results in the conviction of the innocent.”). 
 156. David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER 
(Sept. 7, 2009), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https://perma.cc/
VRF3-ZY77 (dark archive)]. 
 157. Id. (alteration in original). 
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Professor Richard Leo identifies this phenomenon as the “false 
evidence ploy” and contends that it is particularly potent when 
deployed during eyewitnesses interviews and suspect interrogations.158 
Leo has found that the false evidence ploy creates a higher risk of 
false confessions and misidentification because lay people “tend to 
defer to scientific evidence.”159 Indeed, such misuse of “scientific 
evidence,” which is viewed as reliable and impartial, is the “most 
potent kind of evidence ploy,” the “strongest at creating the risk of 
false or unreliable confessions,” and highly likely to induce an altered 
memory in an eyewitness.160 
D. Cognitive Biases: Tunnel Vision and Role Effect 
Forensic findings also run the risk of being influenced by various 
forms of cognitive biases, including tunnel vision and role effect. 
Research on cognitive biases challenges how forensic science 
evidence is collected and evaluated and questions whether forensic 
findings are arrived at objectively and independently or are, instead, 
police-dependent determinations.161 
“Tunnel vision” is widely understood as a “‘compendium of 
common heuristics and logical fallacies,’ to which we are all 
susceptible, that lead actors in the criminal justice system to ‘focus on 
a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will “build a case” for 
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away 
from guilt.’”162 Tunnel vision engenders police and prosecutors to 
focus on one theory of the crime and filter all case-related evidence 
exclusively through the lens of that theory.163 As NFPA 921 
emphasizes, tunnel vision and expectation bias are of particular 
 
 158. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 147–48, State v. Donley, No. 03-CF-1035 (Wis. 
Cir. Ct. June 16, 2014) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 159. Id. at 148. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic 
Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1230–32 (2010) (examining cognitive biases in 
fingerprint analysis). 
 162. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (quoting Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About 
Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of 
Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848 (2002)). 
 163. Id.; see also Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A 
Commentary on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 
1327–28. 
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concern in fire investigations,164 where these phenomena can provoke 
fire investigators to disregard exculpatory evidence.165 
Expectation bias, a form of confirmation bias,166 results in a 
“selective information search and biased interpretation of available 
information.”167 Similar to tunnel vision, expectation bias induces 
investigators to seek information and evidence that confirms, rather 
than disproves, a working theory of arson.168 Therefore, fire 
investigators pursuing an arson theory are susceptible to dismissing as 
irrelevant or unreliable any evidence inconsistent with arson, such as 
evidence that points to an alternative fire source.169 NFPA 921 warns 
fire investigators to be wary of expectation bias, explaining that such 
a phenomenon occurs “when [an] investigator[] reach[es] a premature 
conclusion without having examined or considered all of the relevant 
data,” thereby causing “premature determination[s] to dictate 
investigative processes, analyses, and .	.	. conclusions, in a way that is 
not scientifically valid.”170 
As explained above, fire investigators are often law enforcement 
officers.171 Accordingly, they are likely to have similar motives as the 
 
 164. See NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶¶	4.1, 4.3.9. 
 165. Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of 
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1097 (2013) (“Cognitive 
bias of this sort is likely to have particularly perverse effects with respect to precisely the 
types of forensic evidence that, from a reliability-enhancing perspective, we should be 
most concerned about: exculpatory science, and science that is less than the ‘gold 
standard.’ On the former count, confirmation bias and tunnel vision have been widely 
accepted as causes of erroneous disregard, rejection, or recharacterization of exculpatory 
evidence by both police and prosecutors, and the anecdotal evidence is that the force of 
science does not render forensic evidence immune to this pressure.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 166. Findley & Scott, supra note 162, at 308 (“The foundational tendency is probably 
best understood as an expectancy bias, which is a form of confirmation bias. When people 
are led by circumstances to expect some fact or condition (as people commonly are), they 
tend to perceive that fact or condition in informationally ambiguous situations. This can 
lead to error biased in the direction of the expectation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 167. Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, Itiel E. Dror & Ruth M. Morgan, The Emergence of 
Cognitive Bias in Forensic Science and Criminal Investigations, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL 
STUD. 527, 537 (2015) (“Selective information search within legal perspectives occurs 
when an individual examines information or evidence to incriminate a suspect based on a 
personal hypothesis, and ignores the search for evidence that could exonerate or lead to 
an alternative hypothesis.”); see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision 
Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1588–1613 
(2006). 
 168. See Burke, supra note 167, at 1594–99 (discussing issues with confirmation bias 
and “selective information processing”). 
 169. See Findley & Scott, supra note 162, at 292. 
 170. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶	4.3.9. 
 171. See supra Introduction. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
2019] EVIDENCE ON FIRE 513 
other police and prosecutors with whom they work.172 A fire 
investigator who views himself as a member of the police or 
prosecutorial team is unlikely to perform as an objective, impartial 
scientist; instead, he is vulnerable to subjective, “role effect” 
heuristics,173 much like technicians who work in police-controlled 
forensic labs.174 “Forensic scientists, aware of the desired result of 
their analyses, might be influenced—even unwittingly—to interpret 
ambiguous data or fabricate results to support the police theory.”175 
This “additional evidence then enters a feedback loop that bolsters 
the [investigator’s] confidence in the reliability and accuracy of their 
incriminating [evidence] .	.	. and reinforces the original assessment of 
guilt.”176 
Professor Sandra Thompson characterizes the process by which 
police agencies or prosecutors provide accolades to crime lab analysts 
for case analysis that leads to a conviction as the “kudos” effect.177 
Like its sister forensic disciplines, fire science was developed by law 
enforcement as a tool to investigate and solve crimes. Consequently, 
fire investigators are encouraged to reach the “right” result, that is, 
the one that matches the police theory of the crime,178 “[i]nstead of 
collecting and examining all of the data in a logical and unbiased 
manner to reach a scientifically reliable conclusion.”179 
IV.  THE UGLY: DAUBERT IS NO REMEDY IN STATES THAT FAIL TO 
RECOGNIZE FIRE SCIENCE AS SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY 
We contend the evidentiary reliability and validity standards 
applicable to fire-science evidence need to be as robust in criminal 
cases as they are in their civil counterparts. We are not alone: three 
state legislatures have passed resolutions that individuals who have 
been convicted of arson based on methods inconsistent with the 
scientific principles of NFPA 921 are entitled to postconviction 
 
 172. This concern of role bias is frequently raised in discussions concerning police-
controlled crime labs, in which the police and prosecutors have overlapping interests. 
 173. See THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 131; Findley & Scott, supra note 162, at 292–93. 
 174. THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 127–44. 
 175. Findley & Scott, supra note 162, at 293. 
 176. See id.; see also THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 131–33 (discussing how “untruthful 
reporting of preliminary findings [have] become a common practice” in numerous 
laboratories). 
 177. THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 127. 
 178. Id. at 127–33. 
 179. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, ¶	4.3.9. 
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judicial review.180 Moreover, the growing cadre of postconviction 
opinions holding trial counsel ineffective for failing to challenge fire 
science181 indicate that faulty forensic-science-induced wrongful 
convictions are not solely attributable overzealous prosecutors: 
defense counsel must raise and preserve challenges to flawed fire 
science during trial proceedings. Perhaps these postconviction 
opinions will encourage skepticism of fire science in criminal cases, 
similar to civil cases. However, the development of such skepticism 
remains elusive if defense attorneys lack adequate tools to challenge 
fire-science experts pretrial. Our discussion below highlights the 
difficulty of challenging fire-science evidence when Daubert does not 
apply. 
A. Trial Counsel as Ineffective for Failing to Challenge Faulty Fire 
Science 
On postconviction review, courts have held defense counsel 
ineffective for failing to request a Daubert hearing during the trial 
proceedings to challenge unreliable arson evidence.182 In United States 
v. Hebshie,183 the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that trial counsel’s failure to challenge the 
testimony of the Commonwealth’s fire experts was constitutionally 
deficient184 and objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. 
Washington.185 The Hebshie opinion explained that “[o]rdinarily 
competent counsel would have understood that men and women had 
been convicted, sentenced, [and] perhaps even executed, on the basis 
of flawed arson evidence and [would] take[] appropriate steps to 
litigate the issues using all the tools available.”186 The Hebshie court 
also concluded that the result of the trial would likely have been 
different if defense counsel had properly challenged the 
Commonwealth’s flawed fire evidence.187 
The First and Sixth Circuits have also addressed issues of 
effective advocacy where the defendants faced incriminating fire 
 
 180. H. Con. Res. 2066, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); Legis. Res. 411, 101st 
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2010); S. Res. 99, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
 181. See, e.g., Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 182. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 95. 
 183. 754 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 184. Id. at 94–95. 
 185. Id. at 122. 
 186. Id. at 92. 
 187. Id. at 119–22. 
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cause and origin testimony in arson cases. In Dugas v. Coplan,188 the 
First Circuit held that defense counsel ineffectively represented his 
client in an alleged grocery store arson.189 The State’s fire 
investigators determined the cause and origin of the fire to be a pile 
of papers that had been located in front of a shelf in the basement, 
ruled out accidental causes, and tested samples of the area of the 
burn, some of which contained medium petroleum distillates.190 
Defense counsel decided against pursuing a “not arson” defense and, 
as such, failed to call any defense experts.191 The First Circuit held 
that decision to be constitutionally deficient for multiple reasons: (1) 
it was the result of a failure to thoroughly investigate, (2) “the arson 
evidence was the cornerstone of the [S]tate’s case,” (3) there was 
sparse other evidence, (4) counsel knew that “a layperson would be 
likely to view the [fire] scene as arson” and that he would need expert 
assistance “to shake the jurors’ views that they were dealing with an 
arson scene,” and (5) there was reason to surmise that the State’s 
cause and origin conclusions were flawed.192 Accordingly, the First 
Circuit found an “inescapable need for expert consultation in [the 
instant] case.”193 
In Richey v. Bradshaw,194 the Sixth Circuit similarly held that 
defense counsel’s failure to properly attack the State’s arson evidence 
at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.195 In Richey, 
defense counsel failed to hire a fire expert until the eve of trial, and 
the expert that he did hire ultimately agreed with the conclusions of 
the State’s expert—without performing independent testing.196 The 
Richey court criticized defense counsel for failing to either inquire as 
to what the State’s expert had done to form his opinion or acquaint 
himself with “the basics of the science involved.”197 The Sixth Circuit 
further explained that 
where counsel knew that there were gaps in the State’s proof 
having to do with the lack of accelerants on Richey’s boots and 
clothing, and the greenhouse owner’s inability to say that any 
 
 188. 428 F.3d 317 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 189. Id. at 319. 
 190. Id. at 320–21. 
 191. Id. at 328. 
 192. Id. at 329–30. 
 193. Id. at 331. 
 194. 498 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 195. See id. at 362–64. 
 196. Id. at 362. 
 197. Id. 
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accelerants were missing, investigating the scientific basis for 
the State’s arson conclusion became all the more imperative.198 
The court concluded by ruling that “[t]here is a reasonable 
probability that had [Richey’s] counsel mounted the available defense 
that the fire was caused by an accident, and was not the result of 
arson at all, the outcome of either the guilt or the penalty phase 
would have been different.”199 
B. Daubert as a Solution? 
As the above-discussed postconviction cases make clear, the 
federal courts expect defense counsel to challenge dubious fire 
science. One manner to do so is for defense counsel to request 
pretrial Daubert hearings. While routine in civil cases involving 
complex scientific testimony, Daubert hearings remain rare in 
criminal cases.200 Moreover, fire investigators are not deemed experts 
subject to Daubert challenges in certain states. As a result, defense 
counsel is precluded from challenging fire-science testimony in 
pretrial Daubert hearings in those jurisdictions. 
C. Fire Science: Scientific v. Technical Experts 
In arson cases, prosecutors rely on the fire investigation to prove 
intent. That is to say, the government needs its fire expert to convince 
the jury that the defendant intentionally set the fire beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Criminal jurors, however, are rarely apprised that 
fire investigators are unqualified to testify as to intent, let alone that 
they frequently base their causation and origin determinations on 
erroneous investigative techniques.201 This is particularly problematic 
because juries are inclined to give forensic evidence far more weight 
 
 198. Id. at 363. 
 199. Id. at 364. 
 200. See, e.g., Garrett Villers, West Virginia and Forensic Science: Presently and 
Moving Forward 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review) (recounting an interview with West Virginia Circuit Court Judge Russell M. 
Clawges, Jr. in which the judge stated that “[i]f there is any question of forensics in a 
criminal case I definitely have a Daubert hearing,” but that “[r]eally you don’t have them 
very often and it’s kind of strange,” and that the “[b]ottom line is that our [c]ourts let it 
in”). 
 201. See, e.g., Plummer & Syed, supra note 61, at 488–89 (explaining that when the lab 
analysis came back negative for gasoline in the house at issue in the Babick case, the fire 
investigator testified at trial that his dog was more accurate at detecting arson than 
laboratory equipment, and the prosecution in closing argued to the jury that “a dog’s nose 
on a trained dog is a mystical thing .	.	. a thousand times more sensitive than the lab 
equipment”). 
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based on an expert witness’s persuasiveness than on evidentiary 
reliability or accuracy.202 The admission of unreliable scientific or 
expert fire testimony creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice 
at trial stemming from the considerable deference that juries tend to 
afford to scientific experts.203 
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the 
importance of trial courts exercising their Daubert-gatekeeping 
function “to evaluate the reliability even of experience-based 
testimony.”204 In Kumho Tire, the question before the Court was 
whether “technical” experts, such as tire engineers, were bound by 
the Daubert reliability factors.205 In answering affirmatively, the Court 
explained that 
whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized 
observations, the specialized translation of those observations 
into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such 
a theory in a particular case, the expert’s testimony often will 
rest “upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the 
jury’s] own.” The trial judge’s effort to assure that the 
specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury 
evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.206 
In reaching its result in Kumho Tire, the Court emphasized three 
points. First, “Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses 
testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the ‘assumption 
that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge 
and experience of his discipline.’”207 Second, the express language of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 fails to distinguish “between ‘scientific’ 
 
 202. Balko, supra note 38. 
 203. See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Because of the 
peculiar risks of expert testimony, courts have imposed an additional test, i. e. that the 
testimony be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory theory.”); see also Neil 
Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 
1125 (2001) (“[J]urors often ‘abdicate their fact-finding obligation’ and simply ‘adopt’ the 
expert’s opinion .	.	.	.” (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Neil Vidmar et al., Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97–1709), reprinted in Neil Vidmar et al., 
Amicus Brief: Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 387, 390 (2000)). 
 204. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). 
 205. Id. at 141. 
 206. Id. at 149 (alteration in original) (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901–1902)). 
 207. Id. at 148 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 
(1993)). 
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knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized” knowledge.’”208 
Finally and perhaps most pragmatically, “it would prove difficult, if 
not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which 
a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between 
‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ 
knowledge.”209 This is because, of course, “[t]here is no clear line that 
divides the one from the others.”210 Simply stated, under federal law, 
Daubert’s general principles are applicable to all expert testimony. 
As pointed out previously, Congress amended Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 in 2000 to expressly incorporate the major premises of 
Daubert and Kumho Tire.211 As the Advisory Committee Notes to 
Rule 702 summarize: 
The amendment affirms the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and 
provides some general standards that the trial court must use to 
assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert 
testimony. Consistently with Kumho, the Rule as amended 
provides that all types of expert testimony present questions of 
admissibility for the trial court in deciding whether the evidence 
is reliable and helpful.212 
To date, at least forty states have adopted Daubert as controlling on 
the issue of expert evidence admissibility.213 Only nineteen of those 
forty states, however, have adopted the holding of Kumho Tire.214 As 
 
 208. Id. at 147. The Court did, however, explain that “Daubert’s list of specific factors 
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.” Id. at 141. 
 209. Id. at 148. 
 210. Id. 
 211. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment. 
 212. Id. (emphasis added). 
 213. See Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, 
EXPERT INST. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-
by-state-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/56MS-EYMC]. 
 214. See MICH. R. EVID. 702; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Memphis, Tenn. v. Gill, 100 
S.W.3d 715, 729 (Ark. 2003); M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 
1999); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000); 
Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 922–25 (Mass. 2006); Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. 
McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35–40 (Miss. 2003); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 
862, 873 (Neb. 2001); Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409, 416–
17 (N.H. 2002); Taylor v. Abernethy, 149 N.C. App. 263, 273, 560 S.E.2d 233, 239 (2002); 
State v. Drummond, 854 N.E.2d 1038, 1063 (Ohio 2006); Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 
594 (Okla. 2003); Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Mfg. (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 
2001); Rogen v. Monson, 609 N.W.2d 456, 462 (S.D. 2000); Gammill v. Jack Williams 
Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 727 (Tex. 1998); USGen New England, Inc. v. Town of 
Rockingham, 862 A.2d 269, 275–76 (Vt. 2004); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 470 
(Wyo. 1999); 4 SPENCER A. GARD, ROBERT C. CASAD & LUMEN N. MULLIGAN, 
KANSAS LAW & PRACTICE, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED §	60-456, Westlaw 
(database updated Oct. 2018); BOBBY MARZINE HARGES & RUSSELL L. JONES, 
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a result, litigants are not entitled to raise Daubert challenges to fire 
evidence that courts deem technical, rather than scientific, knowledge 
in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions. 
D. A Problem with “Technical” Witnesses: Unqualified Experts 
In an effort to establish standardized professional qualifications 
for fire investigators, the NFPA published NFPA 1031: Professional 
Qualifications for Fire Inspector, Fire Investigator, and Fire Prevention 
Education Officer in 1977.215 Ten years later, the NFPA revamped its 
fire professional qualification standards and retitled it as NFPA 1033: 
Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Investigator.216 NFPA 
1033 requires fire investigators to “remain current [on specific, 
enumerated topics] by attending formal education courses, 
workshops, and seminars, and/or through professional publications 
and journals.”217 These topics include, among other things, 
thermodynamics, fire chemistry, thermometry, fire science, fire 
dynamics, explosion dynamics, fire investigation methodology, and 
electricity and electrical systems.218 This industry-created list provides 
courts with guidance in evaluating whether an investigator is qualified 
to testify.219 
As explained above, fire investigators are often law enforcement 
officers who have little additional training beyond weekend seminars 
operated by other scientifically untrained law enforcement officers.220 
It should come as little surprise, therefore, that fire investigators often 
cannot articulate even the basic units of measurement of energy, 
power, or heat flux when confronted on cross-examination.221 John 
Lentini provides the following example of testimony from one of the 
 
LOUISIANA PRACTICE EVIDENCE art. 702, Westlaw (database updated June 2018); 1 
SHIRLEY J. MCAULIFFE, ARIZONA PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §	702:1.50, Westlaw 
(database updated Apr. 2018). 
 215. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 1033: STANDARD FOR PROFESSIONAL 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATOR, at 1033-1 (1993 ed. 1993). 
 216. Id. 
 217. NFPA 1033 (2014), supra note 50, ¶	1.3.8. 
 218. Id. ¶	1.3.7. The complete list of subjects includes: fire science, fire chemistry, 
thermodynamics, thermometry, fire dynamics, explosion dynamics, computer fire 
modeling, fire investigation, fire analysis, fire investigation methodology, fire investigation 
technology, hazardous materials, failure analysis and analytical tools, fire protection 
systems, evidence documentation collection and preservation, and electricity and electrical 
systems. Id. 
 219. John J. Lentini, Confronting Inaccuracy in Fire Cause Determinations, in 
FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT 66, 68 (Wendy J. Koen & C. 
Michael Bowers eds., 2017) [hereinafter Lentini, Confronting Inaccuracy]. 
 220. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 12, at xv. 
 221. Lentini, Confronting Inaccuracy, supra note 219, at 68–70. 
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more highly qualified fire-science experts in the field, specifically, an 
electrical engineer fire investigator: 
Q. How is radiant heat flux measured? 
A. Oh, I can’t remember the actual units but I could look it up. 
I just don’t remember what the actual units are because it’s not 
a common .	.	. 
Q. Do you know what the generally accepted value of radiant 
heat flux that will result in a flashover is? 
A. No. 
Q. If you were outside like today on a cloudless day at noon, 
what is the radiant heat flux that a square meter of the earth’s 
surface is receiving from the sun? 
A. I don’t know.222 
Unfortunately, such lack of basic knowledge on the part of fire 
investigators concerning the fundamentals of energy, power, and heat 
flux is not uncommon. Lentini has cataloged myriad examples of fire 
investigator “expert” testimony from criminal cases, which expose 
those experts’ failure to grasp even the rudimentary components of 
fire behavior.223 For instance, consider the following testimony by a 
certified fire and explosion investigator whose opinion that a 
propane-fired weed burner was used to set a fire resulted in the 
defendant’s capital murder charge: 
Q. Do you know how many BTUs are present in a typical cubic 
foot of propane? 
A. Not at this time. 
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for propane is? 
A. I’m unsure at this time. 
Q. Can you write down the chemical equation that describes the 
burning of propane in air? 
A. I’m unsure. 




 222. Id. at 70. 
 223. Id. at 70–72. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2019) 
2019] EVIDENCE ON FIRE 521 
Q. Can you explain the difference between heat and 
temperature? 
A. My opinion? Not “921” or any .	.	. 
Q. Yeah, your opinion. 
A. Heat is the production of light and temperature from a 
product, and temperature is the natural measurement of that 
heat that’s produced. 
Q. Okay. What’s the basic unit of energy called? 
A. I’m unsure at this time. 
Q. You ever heard of a joule? 
A. I have. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It’s a measurement of energy or that’s how—it has to do 
with electricity as well. 
Q. What are the basic units of power called? 
A. AC and DC. 
Q. I’m sorry? 
A. AC and DC. 
Q. Have you ever heard of a watt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would that be the correct answer? 
A. More than likely. 
Q. What is a watt? 
A. I mean I’m unsure. If you want me to look at a manual and 
give you these answers .	.	. 
Q. Do you know what a watt is? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. How is the size of a fire measured? 
A. I’m unsure at this time. 
Q. Okay. What is radiant heat flux? 
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A. I’m unsure at this time.224 
The prosecutor moved for dismissal at the close of this 
testimony.225 This cross-examination of an alleged fire-science expert 
highlights at least two above-discussed problems pertinent to fire-
expert testimony in criminal arson cases. First, defense counsel are 
frequently incapable of challenging such testimony during a pretrial 
Daubert hearing because the majority of jurisdictions have not 
adopted Kumho Tire and characterize such evidence as technical and 
not scientific. Second, defense counsel often fail to raise Daubert 
challenges even in jurisdictions that have adopted Kumho Tire. 
Consequently, the importance that defense counsel raise Daubert 
challenges to fire-science testimony where permitted and urge courts 
to apply Daubert to fire investigation evidence in non-Kumho Tire 
jurisdictions cannot be overstated in this context. 
V.  BEYOND DAUBERT: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Criminal courts continue to admit unreliable fire-science 
evidence notwithstanding Daubert, Kumho, and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. We therefore propose several beyond-Daubert-styled 
solutions that aim to improve the quality of admissible fire-science 
evidence and thereby mitigate the wrongful conviction rate in cases 
involving fire science. As detailed below, we contend that the 
adoption of error rates, Linear Sequential Unmasking, and a 
standardized tool to evaluate the quality of fire-investigation evidence 
would enhance fire-science reliability. We also argue that fire-science 
investigation should be sequestered from criminal investigations and 
that courts should appoint their own experts in criminal cases where 
the prosecution relies on a scientifically untrained fire expert. 
A. Adoption of NFPA 921 as Controlling Is Not Enough 
The NFPA 921 guidelines are critical to criminal fire 
investigations. Indeed, the very purpose of the guidelines is “to 
provide guidance to both public and private investigators based on 
accepted scientific principles and scientific research.”226 NFPA 921 is 
central to the National Fire Academy curricula. 
 
 224. Id. at 72. Unbelievably, this “expert” asserted that he held a “‘magma [sic] cum 
laude’ degree in fire science.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 225. Id. 
 226. NFPA 921 (2017), supra note 56, at 921-1. This guidance is important since, 
“[u]nlike [other] forensic counterparts, fire investigators must determine whether a crime 
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While some courts recognize NFPA 921 as the gold standard227 in 
fire investigation, others treat it like the Pirates’ Code, espousing the 
attitude that NFPA 921 “is more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than 
actual rules.”228 A recent decision by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, for example, entirely ignored the NFPA 921 
standards in reviewing a botched fire investigation and held that, 
because the State had proven sufficient “motive,” the inadequate 
underlying fire investigation was immaterial.229 According to the 
court, 
Although the .	.	. NFPA .	.	. has been cited in statutory and 
regulatory laws in this state, we cannot find, nor do the parties 
cite, any statute or regulation where the [West Virginia] State 
Fire Commission has expressly adopted NFPA 921 as either a 
compulsory or mandatory standard to be followed in fire 
investigations in this state.230 
In sum, “NFPA 921 continues to be described in terms of constituting 
‘guidelines.’”231 
 
has taken place at all.” Rachel Dioso-Villa, Case Study: Cameron Todd Willingham, in 
FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 219, at 58, 61. 
 227. McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The ‘gold 
standard’ for fire investigations is codified in NFPA 921, and its testing methodologies are 
well known in the fire investigation community and familiar to the courts.”). 
 228. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney 
Pictures 2003). In the film, there is an exchange between Captain Barbossa, commander of 
the Black Pearl, and Elizabeth Swan, during which Swan attempts to invoke the “Code of 
the Order of the Brethren,” that is, “the Pirates’ Code.” Id. In response, Captain Barbossa 
explains that “the code is more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules. Welcome 
aboard the Black Pearl .	.	.	.” Id.; cf. Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 
2012) (“NFPA 921 qualifies as ‘a reliable method endorsed by a professional 
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NFPA 921 must apply its contents reliably.” (citation omitted) (quoting Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 2005))). The IAAI, which 
waited until 2013 to tepidly endorse NFPA 921, maintains that NFPA 921 is “widely 
recognized as an authoritative guide for the fire investigation profession,” “an important 
reference manual [that] sets forth guidance and methodology regarding the determination 
of the origin and cause of fires.” NFPA 921/1033 Position Statement, supra note 74. The 
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care in fire investigation. Id. 
 229. Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 880 & n.56 (W. Va. 2016). 
 230. Id. at 875–76 (footnotes omitted). 
 231. Id. at 876. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the 
change in arson science did not constitute newly discovered evidence—without conducting 
any analysis of the scientific evidence. Id. at 877–80. The court focused its conclusion on 
two main points: (1) the NFPA 921 guidelines were not codified in the West Virginia 
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875–80. 
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Moreover, even courts that do treat NFPA 921 as controlling in 
fire investigations are abdicating their gatekeeping function under 
Daubert. This is because NFPA 921 continues to permit various 
flawed investigatory methodologies that have led to notable 
miscarriages of justice.232 A fire investigation that limits its analysis to 
the quadrant of presumed origin is sufficient. NFPA 921 also fails to 
acknowledge the simple truism that oftentimes fire evidence is simply 
too damaged to provide an investigator with a reasonable opportunity 
to conduct a credible analysis of the scene. Finally, while NFPA 921 
pays lip service to cognitive bias concerns, it nonetheless condones 
the practice of fire investigators conducting eyewitness interviews 
prior to performing any independent examination of the crime scene. 
B. Linear Sequential Unmasking 
Fortunately, various forensic-discipline-related practices and 
processes have been developed to address some of the error-related 
problems persistent to those disciplines. For example, bias is 
mitigated and minimized in other forensic disciplines through a 
context management tool entitled “Linear Sequential Unmasking” 
(“LSU”).233 LSU “not only requires examiners to first examine the 
trace evidence in isolation from the reference material, but also 
provides a balanced restriction on the changes that are permitted 
postexposure to the reference material.”234 The AAAS recently 
advocated for the incorporation of LSU in fire-science 
investigations.235 
As the AAAS Quality and Gap Analysis—Fire Investigation 
concedes, fire investigators have minimal training in research and 
statistical methods. As such, the AAAS contends that, 
[g]iven what is known about the role of cognitive bias in 
interpretation and decision making, the work by fire scene 
investigators should be separated from other components of the 
fire investigation. Those who gather and prepare evidence 
should focus on scientific analysis and be as neutral as possible 
in deciding what evidence to collect and how to interpret it. 
 
 232. See supra Section III.C (discussing how faulty fire investigation methods result in 
wrongful convictions). 
 233. Dan E. Krane et al., Letter to the Editor, Sequential Unmasking: A Means of 
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 
1006 (2008). 
 234. Itiel E. Dror et al., Letter to the Editor, Context Management Toolbox: A Linear 
Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic 
Decision Making, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1111, 1112 (2015). 
 235. HANGER, supra note 10, at 7. 
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This would help to minimize bias that might affect fire scene 
investigation.236 
Ultimately, the AAAS recommends that “[c]ase management 
interventions should be adopted that shield fire scene investigators 
from information that is irrelevant and potentially biasing” and that 
fire “investigators should only consider scientific evidence that is 
critical to determining a fire’s origin and cause.”237 LSU would ensure 
the masking of eyewitness accounts until investigators complete an 
independent assessment of the fire scene. It would also provide for 
the redaction of eyewitness accounts to limit their content to relevant, 
material information. 
Fire expert Paul Bieber and the Midwest Innocence Project are 
currently creating a program to provide LSU for arson cases on 
postconviction review.238 This novel forensic audit program intends to 
permit different parties to perform evaluative functions 
independently and only then to share information. The program will 
send pertinent—yet bias-stripped—fire scene information to two 
independent fire investigators for review. Moreover, the independent 
auditors reviewing the case will only be provided information as 
needed subsequent to their initial review. This auditing program 
promises to identify errors in forensic expert conclusions in fire-
science cases.239 Hopefully, the program’s findings and conclusions 
motivate fire-investigation teams across the country to consider the 
adoption of LSU in an attempt to mitigate cognitive bias concerns 
that infect fire-science investigations and can lead to wrongful 
convictions. 
C. Error Rates 
We further propose that courts demand that fire science develop 
origin and cause error rates much like courts require of other types of 
causation evidence, such as epidemiological and toxicological 
causation evidence in civil toxic tort and products liability litigation. 
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As has been pointed out repeatedly in this Article, the ability of fire 
investigators to accurately determine fire origin and cause decreases 
dramatically as fires become more fully involved over time. For 
example, “[i]n a 2007 unpublished study conducted by the ATF, only 
13 of 53 investigators were able to correctly identify the quadrant of 
origin in a fire that burned for 180 seconds beyond flashover; this is 
no better than random chance.”240 One of the primary reasons why 
fully involved fire origin error rates are so extravagant is because the 
fire itself destroys much, if not all, of the viable evidence at the scene 
that might assist investigators in determining origin and cause. 
As the PCAST Report explains, courts are precluded under 
Daubert from admitting forensic evidence testimony, such as fire 
science, that lacks “any meaningful scientific validation, 
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits 
of the discipline.”241 The proposition that forensic evidence ought to 
be inadmissible where, as is the case with fire science, the field at 
issue has failed to develop any reliable error rates is uncontroversial 
in the scientific community. Indeed, “an expert’s expression of 
confidence based on personal professional experience or expressions 
of consensus among practitioners about the accuracy of their field is 
no substitute for error rates estimated from relevant [and replicable] 
studies.”242 
D. Development of an Objective Standard Regarding the Quality of 
the Fire-Related Evidence 
In addition to LSU and the development of evidence-based error 
rates, we recommend that the field of fire science develop a 
standardized tool that determines whether the evidence at the scene 
is in a condition such that any reasonable determination of cause and 
origin can be ascertained. That is to say, there should be an objective 
measure of whether the quality of fire-science evidence is sufficient to 
make reliable and valid cause and origin determinations. Fire science 
could take its lead here from fingerprint examiners, who have 
developed the ACE-V methodology (analysis, comparison, 
evaluation, and verification) to determine, as a threshold matter, 
whether a fingerprint is of adequate quantity or quality of features to 
be used in a comparison.243 Where a fingerprint examiner determines 
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under ACE-V that a print is inadequate, the examination ends and 
the print is reported as not suitable.244 Given the anecdotally high 
cause and origin error rates that attend to postflashover fires due to 
near-complete evidence degradation, we advocate that fire 
investigators develop an objective threshold standard, which demands 
they stop a fire investigation where the fire-related evidence is 
inadequate to make reliable and valid cause and origin 
determinations. 
E. Increased Utilization of Court-Appointed Experts 
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and comparable state rules of 
evidence permit judges to appoint an independent expert to assist the 
court.245 Unfortunately, federal judges appear reticent to invoke Rule 
706 and appoint an independent expert even where the case at hand 
seems to demand such testimony to reach a just result.246 According to 
a recent study, 80% of federal judges have never appointed a Rule 
706 expert and only approximately 10% have ever done so more than 
once.247 This data is somewhat surprising given that the overwhelming 
majority of judges reported that they found such experts helpful.248 
Given the courts’ low utilization—yet high satisfaction—rates 
regarding Rule 706 expert witnesses, we advise defense counsel to 
make it a practice to request that the trial court appoint an 
independent and qualified fire expert where, as is frequently the case, 
the state relies exclusively on unqualified law enforcement officers to 
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provide “expert” fire-science testimony in arson cases. We further 
contend that, even when defense counsel fails to make such a motion, 
courts ought to appoint said experts on their motion to protect the 
defendant’s right to due process and thereby attempt to avoid a 
potential wrongful conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
“[F]ire investigation suffers from two major challenges to its 
reliability: unqualified practitioners and invalid methodology.”249 
Daubert demands that judges exclude unqualified fire experts and 
unreliable findings in both civil and criminal cases. Our Article argues 
that courts must enforce their gatekeeping function in criminal cases 
by excluding faulty fire science in order to avoid significant 
miscarriages of justice. We specifically contend that courts should 
reject expert testimony based on negative corpus reasoning, as well as 
fire-expert methodologies that have been thoroughly debunked and 
discredited by the relevant scientific community. We further advocate 
that fire investigators determine error rates, develop a standardized 
evidence quality assessment tool, and adopt LSU to mitigate tunnel 
vision, role effect, and other cognitive biases, which can instigate 
unreliable findings and result in significant miscarriages of justice. 
Finally, we propose that courts appoint their own experts in arson 
cases where the State relies exclusively on law enforcement testimony 
or other questionably reliable fire-science evidence. 
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